Brief- Early Recovery Trust Fund (ERTF)

However, there is clear confusion between the objectives of early recovery and reconstruction and their relation to the political process. Many informed Syrians fear that the fund’s goal might be to circumvent the stalled political process and focus on reconstruction, which is contingent upon the initiation of a political solution in Syria, in accordance with international resolutions.

Experts believe that the purpose of early recovery is to enhance local communities’ resilience, improve governance, and strengthen relations between the community, organizations, and local authorities. On the other hand, reconstruction focuses on state-building (institutions) and peacebuilding.

Faced with these challenges, the Wathiqoun Program team at MARS Organization aims to provide a brief of the political landscape surrounding the fund.

In March 2024, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Syria, Adam Abdel-Moula, revealed in an exclusive interview with the Syrian newspaper Al-Watan that the UN would launch a five-year early recovery program in Syria by the summer of 2024. The program will include projects in various sectors, including electricity.

Abdel-Moula stated that funding for the program would be secured through a special fund, providing a safe and legitimate mechanism under international auspices for certain ‘non-traditional donors,’ such as Gulf countries, to offer aid to the Syrian people. These donors currently face restrictions due to unilateral economic sanctions imposed by the United States and Western countries on the Syrian government.

He stated that the unilateral economic sanctions imposed by certain countries, driven by specific considerations, have a direct impact on humanitarian work and may be motivated by political agendas or disputes. “End of quote.”

According to the published statement, Adam Abdel-Moula is primarily counting on financial support from Gulf countries—especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE—to back the “UN Fund” and ensure it remains free from international sanctions.

Given the necessity of early recovery in Syria, it is crucial to guarantee the fund’s neutrality if implemented, ensuring equal opportunities for distributing programs and projects across Syrian regions. This distribution should align with the specific needs and early recovery requirements of each geographic area, reflecting the core philosophy of early recovery.

To achieve this, several key factors must be considered. However, before outlining these considerations or conditions, let us first examine the perspectives of various Syrian stakeholders:

Approach I. Syrian Organizations operating in the sectors of Education, Health, and Capacity-Building 

Many members of this group argue for the need to frame the fund within specific parameters that ensure diverse representation and prevent centralization in any one country that could be easily pressured by the Syrian regime.

After reviewing the Syria Strategic Steering Group’s (SSG) early recovery strategy, the group is preparing a position paper based on the following points:

• The draft does not clarify how Northeast Syria will be included in the projects and support.
• The concept of national ownership is not guaranteed in the draft.
• The draft lacks the basic humanitarian principle of ‘Do No Harm‘ during implementation.
  There is no accountability to local communities.
• The absence of a clear vision for key sectors such as education and health could exacerbate fragmentation and ideological spread within Syrian society.

Thus, there are three possible scenarios:

1. Acceptance of the current strategy, which would strengthen the Assad regime’s authority and corrupt institutions, compromise the fund’s transparency and hinder the fair distribution of resources among the Syrian population, leading to the politicization of the fund.
2. Support for the existing authorities which would involve recognizing the de facto authorities and reinforcing Syria’s division based on current territorial control maps.
3. Implementing the early recovery approach seeking to establish mechanisms to harmonize governance and administrative practices across different areas of control in Syria. It involves engaging local communities and adopting principles for recovery and future reconstruction phases.

The primary sectors identified to initiate recovery include education, health, and agriculture. It is emphasized that early recovery should not serve as a substitute for a political solution. Ensuring justice and equity across all Syrian regions is essential, preventing the development of separate strategies for areas under different authorities.

Additionally, several Syrian organizations have launched a petition formally objecting to the draft documents circulated within the Syria Strategic Steering Group (SSG). The objections focus on the methodology used to draft these documents, particularly the proposed approach to early recovery, and the governance framework suggested for managing early recovery activities, especially the governance of the proposed trust fund for early recovery. 

Approach II. Independent Viewpoints

Informed Syrians argue that the core problem lies in politicizing the concept of recovery and the difficulty of developing a comprehensive strategy for all of Syria. They emphasize that the success of the strategy is closely linked to the political situation and warn that the fund, in its current form, might weaken national bodies (directorates, local councils) more than they already are. Key recommendations include:

• Early recovery is a “multi-dimensional approach involving integrated interventions,” meaning that efforts in health, education, and water must be combined with governance, social cohesion, and the rule of law. This aspect is missing from the current strategy, which focuses primarily on addressing the destruction of infrastructure. However, the greater damage caused by the conflict lies in the fragmentation of society, the breakdown of institutions, and governance structures, which have become divided along lines of territorial control.
• The education system must be supported in a way that does not deepen existing divisions.
• It is crucial to influence donors to ensure the neutrality of the fund.
• Engagement with all stakeholders is necessary before adopting the strategy, as it is unrealistic to devise and approve a comprehensive strategy for all of Syria within just two months.

It is also believed that if the fund is established, organizations in northwest Syria will be managed through Gaziantep, Turkey, while those in northeast Syria will be coordinated through international organizations, ensuring the region’s specific context is respected.

Approach III. Organizations within the SSG

It has been reported that Syrian organizations within the SSG applied pressure to prevent the exclusive management of the fund by the UN coordinator in Damascus, advocating instead for a joint management structure between the coordinators in Damascus and Jordan. They identified several critical concerns regarding the strategy:

1. The management and decision-making authority of the fund are limited to the humanitarian and resident coordinators in Damascus, with no role for board members. All requests for broader participation were rejected, citing that the early recovery fund falls solely under the authority of the humanitarian and resident coordinators, despite existing concerns.
2. On the fund’s board—comprising representatives from UN agencies, international organizations, and local organizations—northeast Syria and northwest Syria are each granted a single vote. This arrangement makes it impossible to influence board decisions, which are restricted to technical matters only.
3. The strategy neglects the importance of defining the needs of each “area of control” through direct consultation with the respective regions. As a result, the Gaziantep-based sector, responsible for northwest Syria, cannot play a meaningful role in needs assessment to ensure fair resource distribution. Instead, needs assessments are managed solely by the resident and humanitarian coordinators in Damascus, potentially channeling significant funds to the Assad regime. The same concerns apply to northeast Syria.
4. There are fears that the strategy could pave the way for reconstruction efforts before reaching a political solution.
5. The fund may become a tool to bring northwest Syria under the regime’s control, using the pretext of the need for coordination with the regime to implement projects.

Approach IV. Syrian Negotiation Committee

According to the Syrian Negotiation Commission, the fund is seen as a circumvention of international resolutions and an attempt to normalize relations with the Syrian regime. However, countries such as France and the United States have expressed their refusal to participate in the fund. The commission has proposed the following options:

1. Complete rejection of the fund’s approval.
2. If the fund is approved, the following conditions must be demanded:

1. A neutral location for the fund’s management, such as Geneva.
2. Dual official representation in the fund’s management, involving both opposition and regime representatives, or other active organizations.
3. Ensuring the fair distribution of the fund’s resources.
4. A clear distinction between early recovery and reconstruction to prevent misuse of the fund’s purpose.

Based on the above, the Syrian opposition can be divided into three camps:

1. Those who oppose the fund and view it as an attempt to bypass the political process and pave the way for reconstruction without conditions.
2. Those who support the fund on the condition that fair distribution, shared management, and national strategies in areas like education and health are ensured.
3. Organizations and groups willing to work with the fund, including those open to setting up licensed offices in Damascus.

Given these different stances, it is essential to highlight key conditions if the early recovery fund becomes imminent:

1. Active participation of Syrian actors in the fund’s management, administratively and technically, to ensure proper representation, with governance principles of participation, transparency, and accountability in place.
2. Flexibility to amend the strategy’s core components in line with the needs and requirements of different areas across Syria.
3. Defined decision-making mechanisms that align with the principle of shared decision-making, ensuring no single entity holds final authority. Decisions within the SSG must be democratic, rather than dictated by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Syria, Adam Abdel-Moula.

Finally, the early recovery fund is an initiative supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), focusing on sustainable development, assisting in reconstruction, and post-crisis recovery. It funds and manages long-term projects aimed at rebuilding infrastructure and institutions after conflicts and disasters. Meanwhile, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) focuses on coordinating emergency humanitarian efforts and crisis response. Indications suggest that OCHA might assume a leading role in managing the funds. If confirmed, this could introduce additional administrative and employment pressures on the process.